OF MERIT BADGES AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION: THE

NEw JERSEY SuiRM COURT BALANCES THE LAW
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION AND TILE FREEDOM OF

ASSOCIATION IN DALE V. BoY ScouT OFAMFJCA
It seems that nearly every serious discussion of the freedom of
association begins with a quotation from Alexis de Tocqueville, the
famed nineteenth century political theorist.' This trend can be
explained in part by Tocqueville's willingness to trumpet the benefits
of, and the need for, associational rights during an era when
pluralistic rights were not yet in vogue to the extent they are today.
Tocqueville's writings would seem less significant if the United States
Constitution expressly guaranteed the right to associate, but the
Framers declined to include such a right among the specific
See Amy Gutmann, Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay, in FREEDOM OF
ASSOCATION 3, 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998) (quoting Tocqueville on first page of
first chapter); Andrew M. Perlman, Public Accommodation Laws and the Dual Nature of
the Freedom of Association, 8 GEo. MASON U. Civ. RTS. LJ. 111, 114 (1998) (quoting
Tocqueville); Deanna Lynne Mueller, Note, Supreme Court Upholds New York City
OrdinanceAimed at Alleviating Discriminationin All-Male Social Clubs by Defining "Public
Accommodations"-New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225
(1988), 20 SErON HALL L. REV. 246, 246 (1989) (beginning Note with a Tocqueville
quotation); see also AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 32 (1995)
(observing that it has become "de rigeur" to commence any discussion of "groups in
America with Alexis de Tocqueville's observation that, 'Better use has been made of
association and this powerful instrument of action has been applied to more varied
aims in America than anywhere else in the world'").
2 See generally 1 ALExIs DE TOcQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (P. Bradley ed.,
1984). Tocqueville writes:
The most natural privilege of man . . . is that of combining his
exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in common
with them. The right of association therefore appears to me almost as
inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator
can attack it without impairing the foundations of society.
Id. at 196.
Although political associations formed the primary focus of Tocqueville's work,
he also stressed that groups of all sorts, "religious, moral, serious, futile, very general
and very limited, immensely large and very minute," serve indispensable roles in any
thriving society. Gutmann, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Tocqueville) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Yael Tamir, Revisiting the Civic Sphere, in FREEDOM
OFAssOcATION, supra note 1, at 214, 214 ("In the recent literature, the revival of civic
associationsand the civic sphere is offered as a panacea for all the main illnesses of
modern society .... .") (emphasis added).
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protections in the Bill of Rights.!
Influenced by Tocqueville, legal commentators have argued that
associational rights play so vital a role within the constitutional
framework that they warrant a place among the implied fundamental
rights.' To date, however, the United States Supreme Court has
declined a wholesale adoption of this approach, opting instead to
recognize an implied freedom of association in the Constitution only
to the extent necessary to protect other expressly guaranteed rights."
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have divided the
freedom of association into discrete rights of intimate association and
expressive association. The freedom of intimate association restricts
a state's ability to interfere with a person's choice to enter into and
maintain highly personal relationships.! Although these intimate
s See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I. The United States Constitution states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances." Id. The text of the United States Constitution fails to
specifically mention an express freedom of association. See id.; see also 16A AM. JUR.
2D Constitutional Law § 539 (1998) (observing that "[nlowhere does the word
'association' appear" in the Constitution).
4 See George Kateb, The Value of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATiON,
supra
note 1, at 35, 35-36. Kateb laments that "[n]o fundamental right of association across
the whole range of human activities is unambiguously protected." Id. at 35. This is
the unfortunate result, Kateb believes, of relegating the freedom of association to
second-class status-relying on it only when doing so is necessary to protect one of
the other expressly protected rights under the Constitution. See id. Kateb is
convinced that defining the freedom of association vis-i-vis the specifically
enumerated rights fails to "honor[ ] it as integral to a free human life, to being a free
person." Id. at 36.
5 See infra notes 46-83 and accompanying text; see also 16A AM. JUR.
2D
ConstitutionalLaw § 539 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court "has concluded that
a right to freedom of association exists as one of the necessary concomitants to the
more specific guarantees of the First Amendment"); J. Michael Huget, Note, Roberts
v. United States Jaycees: What PriceFreedom of Association?, 1985 DET. C.L. REv. 149,
150 (1985) (stating that the freedom of association does not "enjoy status as [an]
independent constitutional right[ ] ... [and that it] exist[s] only in relation to other
constitutional protections"). But see Paul Varela, Note, A Scout Is Friendly: Freedom of
Association and the State Effort to End PrivateDiscrimination, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 919,
923 (1989) (explaining that "some cases have hinted that freedom of association may
be an independent right").
6 See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12-14
(1988);
Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987); Roberts v.
United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 483 (1965); infra note 57 (reproducingJustice Douglas's description of marriage
as one construct worthy of the protection of freedom of intimate association).
See Robert N. Johnson, Note, Board of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte: Redefining Associational Rights, 1988 BYU L. REv. 141, 144
(1988) (noting that intimate association affords qualifying relationships "a
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relationships are characterized by familial and marital bonds, the
protection itself is not necessarily limited to the family.8 By
comparison, the freedom of expressive association protects
individuals who assemble for the purpose of pursuing rights
protected by the First Amendment-speech, assembly, and
petitioning the government for redress of grievances." These rights
would be largely illusory unless people were allowed to exercise such
rights with like-minded individuals.'0
The freedom of association has proved particularly difficult to
apply in the context of governmental efforts to combat discriminatory
practices among private organizations." This difficulty derives from
the competing interests of the individual's right to choose his
associates and
the state's interest in ensuring the equal treatment of
2
its citizens.

substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State"); Lois M.
McKenna, Note, Freedom of Association or Gender Discrimination? New York State Club
Association v. City of New York, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1061, 1067 (1989) (observing that
intimate association protects familial relationships).
a See The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Leading Cases, 98 HARV. L. REv. 87, 197
(1984) [hereinafter 1983 Term] (observing that the "relationships that 'attend the
creation and sustenance of a family' exemplify protected intimate associations"
(quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)); Huget, supra
note 5, at 150 (including among the relationships protected by the freedom of
association those "arising out of the creation and maintenance of the family").
9 See 1983 Term, supra note 8, at 198 (stating that expressive association protects
the exercise of First Amendment activities); Sally Frank, The Key to Unlocking the
Clubhouse Door: The Application of Antidiscrimination Laws to Quasi-Private Clubs, 2
Micti. J. GENDER & L. 27, 57 (1994) (noting that free speech, assembly, and
petitioning the government are all protected by the freedom of expressive
association).
10 See Mueller, supra note 1, at 255 (observing that the freedom of expressive
association preserves diversity by allowing citizens to associate with persons of their
own choosing).
11 See Douglas 0. Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. Rv. 1878, 1880-82 (1984). The early cases recognizing a
freedom of association often involved state government attempts to interfere with the
activities of civil rights groups. See Frank, supra note 9, at 58 ("Early freedom of
association cases involved civil rights organizations."). More recent litigation in this
area normally arises out of attempts by state governments to eliminate discrimination
within private organizations (i.e., antidiscrimination laws). See id. at 59.
12 See Linder, supra note 11, at 1880 (observing that public accommodation laws
can bring into conflict the principles of equality and associational freedom). The
Supreme Court has addressed the "freedom of association versus equality" conflict in
other contexts. See id. For example, antidiscrimination laws aimed at employment,
housing, education, and access to business establishments all raised similar issues and
concerns. See id. In those areas, however, the Court routinely held that equality
rights trumped associational rights because "an unbounded freedom to dis-associate
would cripple the guarantees of equality contained in the Constitution and our Civil
Rights statutes, since every ban on discrimination would be checkmated by an
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Recently, in Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 3 the New Jersey
Supreme Court considered whether the State's antidiscrimination
statute prohibits Boy Scouts of America (Boy Scouts) from excluding
avowed homosexuals." The court held that Boy Scouts is a place of
public accommodation subject to New Jersey's Law Against
Discrimination (LAD) and, therefore, may not exclude persons on
the basis of sexual orientation. 5 The court further held that
application of the LAD in this manner does not
impermissibly
6
infringe upon Boy Scouts' First Amendment rights.
James Dale first joined Boy Scouts of America in 1978, when he
was eight years old. 17 During the course of the following decade, Dale

assertion of individual autonomy phrased as a claim of associational freedom." Id.
(quoting Brief Amicus Curia! of American Civil Liberties Union at 12, Roberts v.
United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)) (internal quotations omitted). Although
this might suggest that the fate of private organizations was predetermined, Professor
Linder suggests two reasons why this is not necessarily true. See id. at 1880-81. First,
denying a person the intangible benefits of membership does not implicate society's
interest in equality to the same extent that denying a person the tangible benefits of
housing, education, and employment does. See id. Second, the right of an
organization to select its own members is a right that is fundamental to a pluralistic
democracy. See id. at 1881.
Another factor explaining the heightened tension in this area is that the
American legal system does not easily adapt to a definition of legal rights that is not
based on the individual. See RicHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 79-80 (4th ed., 1996) (observing that
the public rights model, unlike the private rights model, has developed only in
recent years); Linder, supra note 11, at 1881 (reasoning that the friction between
equality and associational freedom is just part of a larger tension between rightsbased liberalism, which focuses on the individual, and communitarianism, which
focuses on the community); see also SOIFER, supra note 1, at 1. Soifer writes:
As individuals, we are largely defined by our groups. Associationswhether voluntary or imposed-constitute inescapable elements of
identity. Yet the American legal system lacks any theory to handle
groups. The dominant legal paradigm in American law is the
relationship between individual and state. The company we keep is
presumed to be each person's own business, beyond the notice of the
law.
Id.
14 160 N.J. 562, 734 A.2d 1196 (1999).
See id. at 584, 734 A.2d at 1207-08.
15 See id. at 624, 734 A.2d at 1229-30. The court wrote,
"Today, we hold that Boy
Scouts is a 'place of public accommodation' and is, therefore, subject to the
provisions of the LAD." Id., 734 A.2d at 1230. The court further explained that "[a]s
a 'place of public accommodation' [Boy Scouts] cannot deny any person
'accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges . . . because of. .. sexual
orientation.'" Id. (quoting NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993)).
16 See it. ("For the reasons set forth in this opinion, application
of the LAD does
not infringe on Boy Scouts' First Amendment rights.").
17 See id. at 577, 734 A.2d
at 1204.
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successfully rose through the youth membership ranks, eventually
reaching the prestigious rank of Eagle Scout in 1988.'8 Upon turning
eighteen, Dale applied for, and was granted, adult membership in
Boy Scouts, which allowed him to remain active in his local council as
an assistant scoutmaster. 19
At college, Dale acknowledged to himself and to others for the
first time that he was a homosexual.2 0 Dale's sexual orientation did
not become widely known, however, until July 1990, when a New
Jersey newspaper identified him as co-president of the Lesbian/Gay
Alliance at Rutgers University.2 ' Shortly thereafter, Boy Scouts
informed Dale that his membership was revoked because his
homosexuality conflicted with the organization's established
standards for leadership.'
Dale subsequently filed a complaint against Boy Scouts in the
Superior Court of New Jersey seeking various forms of relief." The
complaint alleged that Boy Scouts' decision to exclude Dale was
based upon his homosexuality, thereby violating both New Jersey's
LAD and common law. 4 Dale moved for partial summary judgment,
is See id. at 577-78, 734 A.2d at 1204. During his long association with the Boy
Scouts of America, Dale achieved the following ranks: Cub Scout (1978-1981); Boy
Scout (1981-1988); Eagle Scout (1988); and Assistant Scoutmaster (1989-1990). See
id
,9 See Dae, 160 N.J. at 578, 734A.2d at 1204.
20 See id
21 See id. at 578, 734 A.2d at 1204-05.
The court explained that "Dale [was]
attend[ing] a seminar that addressed the ... needs of lesbian and gay teenagers"
when he was interviewed by a reporter from the Star-Ledger newspaper. Id. (alteration
in original). The ensuing article included a photograph of Dale with "a caption
identifying him as 'co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance.'" Id.
at 578, 734 A.2d at 1205 (quoting Kinga Borondy, Seminar Addresses Needs of
Homosexual Teens, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),July 8, 1990, § 2, at 11).
2
See id at 578-79, 734 A.2d at 1205. An earlier letter revoking Dale's
membership failed to state the reason(s) why Dale was being expelled from Boy
Scouts. See id. Not until Dale made a written inquiry did Boy Scouts inform him that
"the standards for leadership . . . specifically forbid membership to homosexuals."
Id. at 579, 734 A.2d at 1205. During the discovery phase of Dale's lawsuit, a Boy
Scouts officer in Dale's local council revealed that he had recognized Dale from the
photo and article appearing in the Star-Ledger newspaper identifying Dale as a
homosexual. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 308 N.J. Super. 516, 526, 706 A.2d
270, 275 (App. Div. 1998).
See Dae, 160 N.J. at 580, 734 A.2d at 1205. Dale asked the court for
declaratory, compensatory, injunctive, and punitive relief. See id.
24 See id The NewJersey Law Against Discrimination
states, in pertinent part:
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and
to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges
of any place of public accommodation, publicly assisted housing
accommodation, and other real property without discrimination
because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital
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and Boy Scouts filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.25 With
respect to Dale's statutory claim, the trial judge concluded that Boy
Scouts is not a "place of public accommodation" within the meaning
of the statute because the intended definition of "place" is a physical
location to which an individual may point. 6 The trial judge further
noted that, assuming for the sake of argument that Boy Scouts is a
place of public accommodation, the organization nevertheless is
exempt from the LAD's coverage because Boy Scouts falls within the
distinctly private institution exception. 2 The court also rejected
Dale's common-law claim, ruling that New Jersey's public policy on
discrimination against homosexuals is expressed in the LAD and not
in any prior common law.28 Finally, the trial judge concluded that
requiring Boy Scouts to readmit Dale would violate the organization's
freedom of expressive association by forcing Boy Scouts to abandon
its policy of excluding avowed homosexuals.2 Having rejected all of
Dale's claims, the trial court accordingly granted Boy Scouts' crossmotion for summary judgment."
On appeal, a divided three-judge panel of the appellate division
affirmed the dismissal of Dale's common-law claim, but reversed the
trial court's dismissal of his statutory claim.3 1 Authoring the majority
status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, or sex, subject
only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons. This
opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993).
SeeDale; 160 N.J. at 580, 734 A.2d at 1205.
26 See Dale, 308 NJ. Super. at 531, 706 A.2d at 278. The trial judge
made
reference to a list of places of public accommodations provided as examples in the
LAD. See id Examples of places of public accommodations on the list include:
hotels, stores, restaurants, theaters, libraries, and schools. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:55() (West 1993). The trial judge held that "'[a] Boy Scout troop bears no similarity
to the enumerated places of public accommodation ... [because] [t]he benefits to
the boys spring not from the 'facility' but from their interaction, training and
experiences as a group.'" Dae 308 N.J. Super. at 531, 706 A.2d at 278 (quoting trial
judge).
See Dale, 308 N.J. Super. at 529, 706 A.2d at 277.
28 See Dale, 160 N.J. at 581, 734 A.2d
at 1206.

See Dale, 308 N.J. Super. at 529, 706 A.2d at 277. The appellate
division
characterized Boy Scouts' freedom of association argument as follows:
"[Boy

Scouts'] mission to instill the values of the Scout Oath and Scout Law in boys who
join the boy scout troops would be undermined if the state intrudes into its internal
affairs by forcing it to accept homosexual members." Id. at 544, 706 A.2d at 284-85.
The trial judge agreed, emphasizing that Boy Scouts consistently enforced a policy of
expelling avowed homosexuals from its ranks and that the freedom of association

prohibited the government from forcing Boy Scouts to abandon this practice. See id.
at 544, 706 A.2d at 285.
See Dale 160 NJ. at 580, 734 A.2d at 1205-06.
31 See Dale 308 N.J. Super. at 561-64, 706 A.2d at 293-95. Judges
Havey and
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opinion, Judge Havey first noted that the lower court had erred when
it interpreted "public accommodation" to require a fixed place,
observing that places do not discriminate; rather, people owning and
operating places do. 32 Judge Havey held that Boy Scouts is a place of
public accommodation because it invites the general public to join its
organization-a characteristic that makes the LAD's "distinctly
private institution" exception inapplicable."
Turning to Dale's
common-law claim, Judge Havey adopted the trial judge's reasoning
and ruled that the claim was properly dismissed as duplicative of the
statutory claim.m Lastly, Judge Havey concluded that requiring Boy
Scouts to readmit Dale would not violate Boy Scouts' freedom of
association!"
Judge Landau issued a separate opinion concurring in part and

Newman constituted the majority. See id. at 274, 706 A.2d at 523. Judge Landau
authored a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. See id. at 56164, 706 A.2d at 293-95.
32 See id. at 533, 706 A.2d at 279 (citing Welsh v. Boy
Scouts of America, 993 F.2d
1267, 1282 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cummings, C.J., dissenting)).
See id. at 536, 540, 706 A.2d at 280, 283. The appellate division noted that
Boy
Scouts' assertion that it was a selective organization was seriously undermined by the
fact that the organization has had approximately ninety million members since its
inception. See id. at 536, 706 A.2d at 281. Boy Scouts responded that for purposes of
plaintiff's suit, selectivity should be determined by relying on the more restrictive
criteria used for adult membership. See id. at 538, 706 A.2d at 282. The appellate
division rejected this approach, choosing instead to assess selectivity by examining
membership in the Boy Scout organization as a whole, rather than focusing on the
adult subset. See id.
See id. at 541-43, 706 A.2d at 283-84. Referring to the common-law claim,
the
majority stated that Dale had failed to convince them that "either at the time of his
expulsion or at present, the public policy of New Jersey required greater regulation
of discrimination within membership organizations than that required by the LAD."
Id. at 542, 706 A.2d at 284. Since the LAD provided Dale with a remedy, Judge Havey
reasoned that it was "unnecessary to recognize or create a common law action to
vindicate substantially the same rights and provide similar relief." Id. at 543, 706
A.2d at 284 (citing Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 NJ. 433, 454, 561 A.2d 1130,
1141 (1989)).
See id. at 543-60, 706 A.2d at 284-93. The appellate division concluded that
neither the freedom of intimate association nor the freedom of expressive
association was implicated by its holding, which required Boy Scouts to admit an
avowed homosexual. See id. at 546, 550-51, 706 A.2d at 286, 288. The immense
number of Boy Scout members alone (approximately five million), the court
reasoned, militates against any finding that the organization's freedom of intimate
association could be implicated by such an application of the LAD. See id.at 546, 706
A.2d at 286. Boy Scouts' freedom of expressive association, by comparison, was not
violated because "enforcement of the LAD by granting plaintiff access to the
accommodations afforded by scouting will not affect in 'any significant way' [Boy
Scouts'] ability to express these views and to carry out these activities." Id. at 550, 706
A.2d at 288.
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dissenting in part.-" Judge Landau agreed that the Law Against
Discrimination prohibits Boy Scouts from revoking Dale's
membership, but he did not believe that the State of New Jersey
could require Boy Scouts to reappoint Dale to a leadership position
without running afoul of the First Amendment." Judge Landau
asserted that compelling Boy Scouts to reappoint Dale, an avowed
homosexual, to a leadership position violated Boy Scouts' freedom of
expressive association by forcing the organization to symbolically
endorse his homosexuality.3
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted both parties' petitions
for certification. 9 The court began by considering whether the LAD
prohibits Boy Scouts from revoking Dale's membership 4 0 The court
held that Boy Scouts is a place of public accommodation even though
the organization does not conduct all of its activities in a fixed
location.4 The court also explained that Boy Scouts fails to qualify
for any of the statutory exceptions, including one that applies to
distinctly private clubs.' Next, the court ruled that the trial court had
properly dismissed Dale's common-law claim as duplicative of his
statutory claim. 3 Shifting its focus to Boy Scouts' affirmative
defenses, the court held that requiring Boy Scouts to readmit Dale
under the LAD does not violate Boy Scouts' freedom of intimate
association because the organization is simply too large and
inclusive." The court also held that reinstatement does not violate
Boy Scouts' freedom of expressive association because (1) the
elimination of discrimination is a compelling state interest, and (2)
Dale's reappointment would not significantly burden Boy Scouts'
ability to express its public viewpoints.5
See id. at 561-64, 706 A.2d at 293-95 (Landau, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
37 See Da/4 308 N.J. Super. at 562-64, 706 A.2d
at 294-95 (Landau, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
M See id. at 563, 706 A.2d at 295 (Landau, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
39 SeeDale v. Boy Scouts of America, 156 NJ. 381,718 A.2d 1210 (1998); Dale v.
Boy Scouts of America, 156 N.J. 382, 718 A.2d 1210 (1998).
See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 160 N.J. 562, 584, 734 A.2d 1196, 1207-08.
See id. at 588-89, 734 A.2d at 1210.
See id. at 600-02, 734 A.2d at 1216-18 (explaining that Boy Scouts is not an
organization that limits membership to those of a specific religion or set of beliefs,
nor a "distinctly private" organization, nor one that assumes the role of in loco
parentis).
43 See id. at 604-05, 734
A.2d at 1219.
See id. at 605-10, 734 A.2d at 1219-22.
45 See id. at 610-21, 734 A.2d
at 1222-28.
40

41
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Until the 1958 case of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,4 the
United States Supreme Court did not formally recognize the freedom
of association as an implied fundamental right in the Constitution.
In Patterson,an Alabama state court ordered the NAACP to hand over
its entire membership list to the state attorney general. 8 Justice
Harlan, writing for a unanimous Court, held that requiring an
organization to reveal the identities of its rank-and-file members
would indirectly burden its members' ability to associate, pursue
collective goals, and espouse their viewpoints because of the public
backlash that might ensue.49
The Court explained that the
government may justify an intrusion into the constitutionally
protected realm of freedom of association only by showing a
compelling state interest."s The Court then concluded that, because
the State of Alabama had failed to meet that threshold, the state
court's order compelling the NAACP to hand over its membership
list was improper. 51
Seven years later, in Griswold v. Connecticut,52 the Supreme Court
expanded the freedom of association to include nonpolitical
relationships.3 The Court examined a Connecticut law that made it
357 U.S. 449 (1958). The Court wrote that "[e]ffective advocacy of both public
and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by
group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon
the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly." Id. at 460.
47 See id. at 460-63; see also 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional
Law § 539 (1998) ("It is
generally conceded that the right of association may be traced to Justice Harlan's
opinion for the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama.").
See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 453. The Attorney General of Alabama alleged that
the NAACP was doing business within the state in violation of Alabama's foreign
corporation statute. See id. at 451-52. When the NAACP denied the allegations in
court, the attorney general moved for the production of the NAACP's membership
list. See id. at 453. The attorney general stated that the membership list, among
other documents, was necessary for an upcoming hearing in which the court was to
determine whether the NAACP was in violation of the statute. See id.
49 See id. at 462-63.
The Court recognized that "compelled disclosure ... may
induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining
it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of
the consequences of this exposure." Id.
50 See id. at 463-66; see also 16A AM.JUR. 2D Constitutional
Law § 539 (1998) ("On a
constitutional level, the right to free association is not absolute; a compelling
governmental interest, such as eliminating discrimination against women, will
override the right to expressive association."); Mueller, supra note 1, at 246 ("The
freedom to associate ... is not an absolute right, but rather is limited by compelling
state interests.").
51 See Patterson,357 U.S.
at 466.
52

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

See id. at 485-86. Of course, in a broader context, Griswold is best known for
finding an implied and constitutionally protected zone of privacy based upon the
5s
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illegal for any person to use birth control devices.' Relying on, inter
alia, its reasoning in Patterson, the Court held that Connecticut
impermissibly interfered with the associational rights of married
couples. s Although the institution of marriage, unlike the NAACP, is
not a union forged for political purposes, the Court nevertheless
concluded that marriage is among the relationships protected by the
freedom of association.6 By stressing the highly intimate nature of
marriage, the Court equated the status of concededly social
relationships with that of purely political groups.5 7
The thorny issue of balancing the organizational right to
associate against the state's interest to outlaw discrimination squarely
.penumbra" of express guarantees in the Bill of Rights. See id. at 484. For purposes
of this Note, however, the importance of Griswold flows from its proposition that
certain intimate relationships fall within this zone of privacy. See ia at 485-86.
54 See id at 480. The Connecticut statute in question provided that
"[a] ny person
who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing
conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty
days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned." CoNN. GEN. STAT. §
53-32 (1958) (repealed 1969).
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. A family-planning organization was convicted
under Connecticut's birth-control laws for advising married couples of the benefits
of contraception. See id. at 480. Although the married couples were not among the
parties to the case, the Court concluded that the organization had standing to argue
on behalf of those with whom a professional relationship had existed. See id. at 481.
See id. at 485-86; see also Mueller, supra note 1, at 254.
57 See id. at 486. Describing marriages, Justice Douglas wrote, "It is an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects... [and] [y]et it is an association
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions." Id.
Griswold made clear that the freedom of association separates into two distinct
freedoms: the freedom of expressive association and the freedom of intimate
association. See supra text accompanying note 6. The Supreme Court approaches
the freedom of expressive association by inquiring as to whether the group's activities
are protected by the First Amendment, while ignoring the nature of the relationship
itself. SeeJohnson, supra note 7, at 142 (explaining that the United States Supreme
Court uses the freedom of association as a mere short-hand phrase to protect
traditional First Amendment rights). The exact opposite is true with respect to the
freedom of intimate association, which protects certain categories of relationships
from governmental intrusion regardless of whether these activities involve the rights
protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 142-43 n.7 (observing that, whereas the
freedom of expressive association can be traced directly to the First Amendment, the
freedom of intimate association stems from the zone of privacy created "by the
[T]hird, [F]ourth, and [F]ifth [A]mendments"); McKenna, supra note 7, at 1067-68
(explaining that the freedom of association is an outgrowth of an individual's right
to privacy). For examples of relationships that the Court has afforded freedom of
intimate association protection, see Zablocki v. Redhai4 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978)
(granting protection to marital relationships); Carey v. Population Services Internationa,
431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) (granting protection to the begetting and bearing of
children); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (granting
protection to co-habitation with relatives).
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presented itself to the Supreme Court for the first time in Roberts v.
United States Jaycees.-" When two Minnesota chapters of the Jaycees
openly began to admit women, thereby violating their bylaws, the
parent organization responded by threatening to revoke the
chapters' charters." The local chapters argued that Minnesota's
public accommodation statute expressly forbidding gender
discrimination precluded the national organization from taking any
adverse actions against them.6 Conversely, the national organization
asserted that requiring the admission of women would violate the
freedom of association rights of its male members.6
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, first addressed the
freedom of intimate association." On a sliding scale, Justice Brennan
explained that familial relationships receive the greatest
constitutional protection, while purely commercial enterprises
receive the least, if any at all.6
Observing that the Jaycees fall
somewhere between these two extremes, the Court nevertheless
concluded that the organization is not protected by the freedom of
intimate association because, unlike a family, the Jaycees are neither
small nor selective.6
Turning to the freedom of expressive
association, the Court acknowledged that the freedoms of speech,
worship, and petitioning the government necessitate a corresponding
right to pursue such goals collectively as a group.6 In this regard, the
58

468 U.S. 609 (1984).

The Jaycees is a nationwide civic organization that
limited regular membership to men between the ages of 18 and 35. See id. at 612-13.
The Jaycees divided membership into regular and associate classes. See id. at 613.
Although women and men who were not between the ages of 18 and 35 could
become associate members, they could not vote, hold office, or take part in certain
proirams. See id.
See id. at 614.
6
See id. at 614-15.
61 See id. at 615.
a See id. at 618-21.
See id. at 619-20. Justice Brennan reasoned that the freedom of intimate
association protects familial relationships because they "involve deep attachments
and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not
only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively
personal aspects of one's life." Id It follows, the Justice reasoned, that nonfamilial
relationships that share these characteristics may, under the right circumstances, also
be entitled to protection under the freedom of association. See id. at 620. The
relevant factors, as the Court listed, are "size, purpose, policies, selectivity,
congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent." Id.
See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621. Both chapters had at least 400 members. See id.
The only admission requirements were age and sex, and even these two criteria were
discarded for the purposes of selecting associate members. See id. at 613, 621.
See id. at 622. Justice Brennan explained that "[a]n individual's freedom to
speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could
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Justice could not conceive of a better example of government action
restricting the associational rights of an organization than a law
requiring the admission of members into a group that would
otherwise choose to exclude them.M
This observation
notwithstanding, the Court ruled that Minnesota's compelling
interest in eliminating discrimination outweighed the infringement
on the associational rights of the Jaycees' male members. 6 The Court
also found that requiring the Jaycees to admit women as regular
members would not significantly alter the content of the group's
expression.68 Therefore, the Court concluded that Minnesota could
compel the Jaycees to admit women as regular members.6
not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative
freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed." Id.
66 See id. at 623. The Court opined that the government might
attempt to abridge
the freedom of expressive association in at least three ways: (1) by imposing
penalties or withholding someone's benefits based upon their membership in a
group; (2) by compelling a group that desires anonymity to disclose its members'
identities; and (3) by interfering with the internal structure or affairs of an
organization. See id. at 622-23.
67 See id. at 623. Justice Brennan reasoned that "[t]he right to associate
for
expressive purposes is not.. . absolute" and may be infringed to "serve compelling
state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." Id The
Roberts Court was "persuaded that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination against its female citizens justifies the impact that application of the
statute to theJaycees may have on the male members' associational freedoms." Id.
68 See id. at 626-27. The Court concluded that "It]here is,
however, no basis in
the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will
impede the organization's ability to engage in these protected activities or to
disseminate its preferred views." Id. at 627. It has been observed that "[bly focusing
on the relationship between an organization's membership selection criteria and the
message the organization seeks to convey, the test follows through on the Court's
premise that the freedom of association . . . is protected only as a means of
protecting expression." 1983 Term, supra note 8, at 201 (discussing the Roberts
decision). By creating such a framework, the Court ensured that the freedom of
association will continue to permit groups to exclude persons so long as that practice
is part of the group's overall message. See id.
Another commentator has been more critical of this portion of the majority's
opinion, observing that "the majority is wrong to dismiss the possibility that the
admission of women would affect the content of the Jaycees' speech activities as
based 'solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative interests and
perspectives of men and women' and on 'sexual stereotyping.'" Under, supra note
11, at 1893. Relying on polling results of men and women, Professor Linder argues
that "the prediction that the votes of female Jaycees members will not, in all cases,
reflect the votes of male members is not merely 'sexual stereotyping.'" Id. Professor
Linder believes that men and women, as groups, experience society differently and
therefore have divergent views. See id.
69 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626. Ironically, shortly after the Supreme Court
handed
down its decision in Roberts, a spokesperson for the Boy Scouts of America went on
the record stating that he was confident that his organization would be afforded the
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Just three years later, the Supreme Court revisited the scope of
associational rights in the private organization context in Board of
0 In Rotay Club,
Directors of Rotary Internationalv. Rotary Club of Duarte."
a California chapter of Rotary International admitted three female
members in contravention of its bylaws, which limited membership to
males.7' When its charter was revoked, the local chapter filed suit,
alleging that Rotary International was in violation California's Unruh
Civil Rights Act 2 Writing for the Court, Justice Powell applied the
factors previously enunciated in Roberts and concluded that Rotary
Club was simply too large and inclusive to claim successfully that its
members engaged in a sufficiently private or personal relationship
warranting protection under the freedom of intimate association.
The Court then held that the compelling state interest in eradicating
gender discrimination justified any possible infringement of the
members' expressive associational rights.7'
The Court further
constitutional protection that the Court had not extended to theJaycees. See Linder,
supra note 11, at 1898 & n.98 (citing Steve Berg, Court Rules Women Can Be Jaycees,
MINNEAPOUS STAR & TRIB., July 4, 1984, at 1A (quoting David Park, general counsel
to the Boy Scouts of America)).
o 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
71 See id. at 539-41. The Rotary Club is a global civic organization.
See id. at 539.
See id at 541. The Unruh Civil Rights Act aims to prevent discrimination
in
California's business establishments. See id. at 542 n.2 (CAL. CrV. CODE § 51 (West
1999)). However, the California Court of Appeals interpreted the term "business
establishments" broadly enough to include Rotary Club even though it is not a
business establishment in the traditional sense of the term. See id at 542; see also
Sharon Swaim, Note, ForcingOpen the Doors of Private Clubs: Warfield v. Peninsula Golf
& Country Club-Did the Court Go Too Far?, 30 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 909, 910 (1997)
("[T]he California Supreme Court recently interpreted the term 'business
establishment' so broadly that it includes almost all private groups."). But see Curran
v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 238 (Cal. 1998)
(holding that Boy Scouts is not a business establishment under the Unruh Civil
Rights Act).
See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545-47. Commencing his analysis, Justice Powell
listed size, selectivity, purpose, and the extent to which outsiders are excluded from
central aspects of the relationship as the critical factors in any determination of
whether a group is sufficiently private or personal to trigger constitutional
protection. See id. at 545-46. Justice Powell remarked that local Rotary Clubs vary in
size from as few as 20 members to as many as 900. See id at 546. Justice Powell also
observed that any given Rotary Club chapter's composition is in constant flux, with
new members regularly replacing outgoing ones. See id. Additionally, Justice Powell
noted, Rotary Club functions are often conducted in the presence of strangers. See
id. at 547. Taken together, theJustice concluded, the factors clearly indicate that the
Rotary Club members do not engage in intimate relationships and, therefore, do not
warrant constitutional protection. See id. at 546.
74 See id. at 549. At least one commentator has applauded the Court's
approach
in Rotary because, by requiring a close nexus between a group's exclusionary
practices and its purpose, the Court achieved a "considerate balancing" of the State's
interest in equal rights with the organization's freedom of association rights. See
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observed, however, that compelling Rotary Club to admit women did
not impede the organization's ability to carry out its purposes
because Rotary Club traditionally had chosen to remain silent on
political issues."
In New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York,76 the Supreme
Court reviewed an amendment to New York City's public
accommodation law that created a bright-line test for determining
whether an organization is public or private in nature."
The
amendment expressly provided that private organizations having
more than four hundred members, regularly serving meals, and
receiving compensation for their services could not avail themselves
of the distinctly private exception." Rather than wait for the city to
enforce the new amendment, the New York State Club Association
sought an immediate declaratory judgment that the amendment was
unconstitutional on its face.f Writing for the majority, Justice White
Johnson, supranote 7, at 158-59.
See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548. Resurrecting an approach that Justice
O'Connor first enunciated in her concurring opinion in Roberts, at least one
commentator has argued that a group should be denied freedom of association
protection if its purposes are primarily commercial instead of political. See Kimberly
S. McGovern, Comment, Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
Duarte: Prying Open the Doors of the Al-Male Club, 11 IHAv. WOMEN'S LJ. 117, 136
(1988). This commentator expounded that "[c]ommercial speech, unlike political
speech, does not receive the highest degree of constitutional protection . . . [and
therefore] association for the purpose of commercial speech should receive a
correspondingly lower level of protection." Id.
76 487 U.S.
1 (1988).
See id. at 4-7. The New York City law in question, as originally enacted in 1965,
closely resembles NewJersey's LAD insofar as it prohibits discrimination in places of
public accommodation, but exempts clubs of a distinctly private nature. Compare
NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5()
(West 1993).
78 See New York State Club, 487 U.S. at 6. By removing organizations
of a certain
size and character from the definition of "distinctly private," New York City was
declaring, albeit in a roundabout manner, that such clubs were sufficiently public to
come within the law's reach. See id. at 5-6. New York City perceived a need for the
amendment because federal and local laws aimed at employment discrimination
failed to address continuing discrimination in "'certain membership organizations
where business deals are often made and personal contacts valuable for business
purposes, employment and professional advancement are formed.'" Id. (quoting
NEw YOMK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986)). "'While such organizations may
avowedly be organized for social, cultural, civic or educational purposes ....
the
commercial nature of some of the activities occurring therein and the prejudicial
impact of these activities on business, professional and employment opportunities of
minorities and women cannot be ignored.'" Id. at 6 (quoting New York City Human
Rights Law). The amendment did exempt, however, benevolent and religious
institutions incorporated in the State of New York. See id. at 6-7.
See id. at 11. The challenger of the amendment, the New York State Club
Association, represented more than 100 private New York clubs. See id. at 8-9.
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upheld the New York City amendment, observing that the law could
be applied constitutionally in some instances. 80 To prove the point,
the Court remarked that New York City's public accommodation law
covered groups comparable to, or larger than, the organizations
previously found to lack intimate association rights in Roberts and
Rotary Club.8 ' The Court similarly envisioned circumstances under
which the law's application would not violate an organization's
freedom of expressive association.n The Court was convinced that
the majority of the clubs covered by the amendment would not be
hampered in their ability to advocate public viewpoints by a law that
merely prohibited them from excluding members on the basis of
race, sex, and other protected criteria.8
In Dale v. Boy Scouts of America," the New Jersey Supreme Court
considered a conflict that pitted New Jersey's Law Against
Discrimination and the freedom of association against one another in

Although the Supreme Court permitted the facial attack, the Court also left little
doubt that the plaintiff faced a higher burden by choosing not to wait for the law's
enforcement before challenging its validity in court. See id. at 11-12. The Court
cautioned:
[T]o prevail on a facial attack the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
challenged law either "could never be applied in a valid manner" or
that even though it may be validly applied to the plaintiff and others, it
nevertheless is so broad that it "may inhibit the constitutionally
protected speech of third parties."
Id. at 11 (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
798 (1984)).
80 See id. at 11-12. The Court explained that the attorney for the
New York State
Club Association "conceded at oral argument, understandably we think, that the
antidiscrimination provisions of the Human Rights Law certainly could be
constitutionally applied at least to some of the large clubs, under this Court's
decisions in Rotary and Roberts." Id.
81 See id. The Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of the Jaycees in Roberts had
approximately 430 and 400 members, respectively. See Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984). In Rotary Club, the size of the chapters ranged
from 20 to 900 members. See Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987).
See New York State Club, 487 U.S. at 13. Justice White commented that the
amendment, on its face, "does not affect 'in any significant way' the ability of
individuals to form associations that will advocate public or private viewpoints." Id.
(quoting Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548).
See id. at 13. The Court subsequently acknowledged that "an association might
be able to show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes and that it will
not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine
its membership to those who share the same sex, for example, or the same religion."
Id. To survive the facial attack, however, the Court merely had to convince itself that
the law could be applied in a constitutional manner in some instances. See id. at 11.
In addition, the Court declined to declare that the law was overbroad. See id. at 14.
94 160 N.J. 562, 734 A.2d
1196 (1999).

966

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 30:951

the context of a national organization's attempt to exclude an avowed
homosexual.85 In Dale, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
LAD prohibits Boy Scouts from discriminating against homosexuals
because the organization is a place of public accommodation within
the meaning of the statute.' The Dale court also held that requiring
Boy Scouts to admit homosexual members does not infringe upon
the organization's freedom
of association, a right guaranteed under
87
the First Amendment.
Chief Justice Poritz, writing for a unanimous court," began the
opinion by addressing Dale's two state law claims, which alleged
violations of New Jersey's LAD and common law. 9 Addressing the
statutory claim first, the court explained that Boy Scouts must
conform to the LAD's requirements only if Boy Scouts is a "place of
public accommodation" and is not entitled to any of the statutory
exceptions. 90 In determining whether Boy Scouts is a place of public
accommodation, the court stressed that the statute's goal of
eliminating discrimination necessitated a broad and liberal
interpretation of the statute's terms."' The court first addressed the
8

See d at 570, 734 A.2d at 1200.

86 See id. at 624, 734 A.2d at 1230.
87

See id. The Court concluded, "In short, the reinstatement of Dale does not

compel Boy Scouts to express any message." Id. at 624, 734 A.2d at 1229.
Justice Handler authored a concurring opinion that fully endorsed the
reasoning of the court as expressed in ChiefJustice Poritz's opinion. See id. at 624651, 734 A.2d at 1230-45 (Handler,J., concurring).
89 See id. at 584-605, 734 A.2d at 1207-19.
90 See Da, 160 N.J. at 584, 734 A.2d at 1207-08 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4,
5(o (West 1993)). NewJersey's LAD states, in pertinent part:
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and
to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges
of any place of public accommodation, publicly assisted housing
accommodation, and other real property without discrimination
because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry,- age, marital
status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, or sex, subject
only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons. This
opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993).
91 See Dale, 160 N.J. at 584-85, 734 A.2d at 1208.
The LAD states:
The Legislature finds and declares that practices of discrimination
against any of its inhabitants, because of... sexual orientation ...
menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic State ....
The Legislature further declares its opposition to such practices of
discrimination .. . in order that the economic prosperity and general
welfare of the inhabitants of the State may be protected and ensured.
The Legislature further finds that because of discrimination, people
suffer personal hardships, and the States suffers a grievous harm.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1993). Most importantly, the statute further states,
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issue of whether the phrase "place of public accommodation" limits
the statute's coverage to organizations operating in a fixed location.2
"The Legislature intends... that this act shall be liberally construed in combination
with other protections available under the laws of this State." Id.
See Dale, 160 N.J. at 585-89, 734 A.2d at 1208-10. The LAD provides that "'[a]
place of public accommodation' shall include, but not be limited to: any.., hotel,..
.summer camp .... store.... restaurant.... auditorium.... theatre .... swimming
pool.... public library[,] ...or any educational institution." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-

5() (West 1993). The court found that this list did not necessitate a fixed location,
stating that "places of public accommodation were not limited to those enumerated
in the statute [and are] 'merely illustrative of the accommodations the Legislature
intended to be within the scope of the statute.'" Dale, 160 N.J. at 585, 734 A.2d at
1208 (quoting Fraser v. Robin Dee Day Camp, 44 N.J. 480, 486, 210 A.2d 208, 211
(1965)). In 1965, the NewJersey Supreme Court discussed for the first time, at any
length, the breadth of the coverage of the LAD. See genera/!y Fraser v. Robin Dee Day
Camp, 44 N.J. 480, 210 A.2d 208 (1965). In Fraser,the court considered whether a
summer day camp operating for profit was a public accommodation under the
statute. See id. at 487, 210 A.2d at 211-12. An African-American father filed an action
against the day camp in NewJersey's Division on Civil Rights after his children were
denied admittance to the camp on the basis of their race. See id. at 482, 210 A.2d at
209. The defendant asserted that it was exempt from the LAD because day camps
are not among the places expressly enumerated in the statute. See id. at 485, 210
A.2d at 211. At the time, the LAD provided, in pertinent part:
"A place of public accommodation" shall include any tavern,
roadhouse, or hotel, whether for entertainment of transient guests or
accommodation of those seeking health, recreation or rest; any retail
shop or store; any restaurant, eating house, or place where food is sold
for consumption on the premises; any place maintained for the sale of
ice cream, ice and fruit preparations or their derivatives, soda water or
confections, or where any beverages of any kind are retailed for
consumption on the premises; any garage, any public conveyance
operated on land or water, or in the air, and stations and terminals
thereof; any public bathhouse, public boardwalk, public seashore
accommodation; any auditorium, meeting place, or public hall; any
theatre, or other place of public amusement, motion-picture house,
music hall, roof garden, skating rink, swimming pool, amusement and
recreation park, fair, bowling alley, gymnasium, shooting gallery,
billiard and pool parlor, any comfort station; any dispensary, clinic or
hospital; and any public library, any kindergarten, primary and
secondary school, trade or business school, high school, academy,
college and university, or any educational institution under the
supervision of the State Board of Education, or the Commissioner of
Education of the State of NewJersey.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-5() (subsequently re-codified as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(0
(West 1993)).
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument
and held that the term "include," which precedes the above list, is a term of
"enlargement and not of limitation . . . [and] the listed places of public
accommodation are merely illustrative." Fraser, 44 N.J. at 485-86, 210 A.2d at 211.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the defendant day camp was covered by the
LAD because it was similar in nature to several of the places listed in the statute (e.g.,
kindergarten and primary schools, swimming pools, etc.). See id at 487, 210 A.2d at
212. As the Dale court notes, less than one year later, the New Jersey Legislature
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Relying on redundant precedent, the New Jersey Supreme Court
rejected this narrow construction of the statute, holding instead that
Boy Scouts is a "place" even though the organization does not
regularly convene at a fixed situs.93
Having concluded that Boy Scouts is a place within the meaning
of the statute, the court then turned to the question of whether Boy
Scouts constitutes a "public accommodation."9 First, Chief Justice
Poritz observed that Boy Scouts engages in widespread public

approvingly codified this portion of the Fraser holding by amending the statute
specifically to provide that places of public accommodation "shall include, but not be
limited to" the accommodations listed in the statute. Dale, 160 N.J. at 585-86, 734 A.2d
at 1208 (emphasis added).
Most notably, the Dale court relied on an opinion handed down 24 years earlier
in National Organizationfor Women v. Little League Basebal, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522,
318 A.2d 33 (App. Div.), aftd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974). In Little League, the
defendant argued that the statutory phrase "a place of public accommodation"
requires that the accommodation operate from a fixed parcel of land over which it
exercises exclusive dominion. Little League, 127 N.J. Super. at 530, 318 A.2d at 37.
The defendant in Little League did not own any of the playing fields where it
conducted tryouts, practices, or games and, therefore, maintained that it was exempt
from the LAD.
See id. at 530-31, 318 A.2d at 37. The court rejected this
interpretation of "place" as too narrow, holding instead that "place" is "a term of
convenience, not of limitation." Id. at 531, 318 A.2d at 37. The court then explained
that "membership organizations . . . are nevertheless places of public
accommodation if... they offer advantages and facilities on the basis of a general,
public invitation to join.". Id. at 530,*318 A.2d at 37-38. The court found that the
various playing fields where Little League convened satisfied the "place" requirement
even though it did not own the land. See id. at 531, 318 A.2d at 37. The Dale court
noted that, despite ample time and opportunity to do so, the NewJersey Legislature
has declined to overturn the holding in Little League in the quarter of a century that
has passed since its publication. See Dale, 160 N.J. at 588, 734 A.2d at 1210.
See Dale, 160 N.J. at 589, 734 A.2d at 1210. In reaching this conclusion, the
court acknowledged that a majority of other jurisdictions applying similar
antidiscrimination statutes have interpreted "place" to require a fixed location. See
id. at 587-88, 734 A.2d at 1209-10 (citing Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 993 F.2d
1267, 1269 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1012 (1993); United States Jaycees v.
Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Alaska 1983); United States Jaycees v. Bloomfield,
434 A.2d 1379, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States Jaycees v. Iowa Civil Rights
Comm'n, 427 N.W.2d 450, 454 (Iowa 1988); United States Jaycees v. Massachusetts
Comm'n Against Discrimination, 463 N.E.2d 1151, 1156 (Mass. 1984)).
However, the Dale court also noted that at least two other jurisdictions have not
interpreted "place" to require a fixed location. See Dale; 160 N.J. at 588, 734 A.2d at
1210 (citing United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 452
N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (N.Y. 1983) and United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d
764, 773 (Minn. 1981)). Borrowing a phrase from the appellate division, the court
punctuated its reasoning by stating: "To have the LAD's reach turn on the definition
of 'place' is irrational because 'places do not discriminate; people who own and
operate places do.'" Da, 160 N.J. at 588-89, 734 A.2d at 1210 (quoting Dale v. Boy
Scouts of America, 308 N.J. Super. 516, 533, 706 A.2d 270, 279 (App. Div. 1998)).
SeeDale, 160 N.J. at 589, 734 A.2d at 1210.
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solicitation" by advertising extensively on a national level" and
recruiting actively on a local level.97 Second, the court observed that
Boy Scouts benefits from close relationships maintained with both
the federal and state governments, in addition to other public
entities, such as public schools. 98 Lastly, Chief Justice Poritz noted
See id. at 590, 734 A.2d at 1211. The court stressed that broad public
solicitation has long been considered a distinguishing characteristic of public
accommodations. See id. at 589, 734 A.2d at 1210. There is ample precedent to
support this proposition; for example, as early as 1966, the New Jersey Supreme
Court considered which characteristics support a finding that an accommodation is
public versus private in nature. See generally Clover Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v.
Goldsboro, 47 N.J. 25, 219 A.2d 161 (1966). In Clover Hill an African-American
veterinarian sought, and was refused, membership in a recreation and social club.
See id. at 27, 219 A.2d at 162. The New Jersey Supreme Court explained that "[a]n
establishment which by advertising or otherwise extends an invitation to the public
generally is a place of public accommodation." Id. at 33, 219 A.2d at 165; see also
Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 1986)
(explaining that the extension of an "open invitation to all... defines the content of
a 'public accommodation[ ]'"); National Organization for Women v. Little League
Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 531, 318 A.2d 33, 37-38 (App. Div. 1974) ("Little
League is a public accommodation because the invitation is open to children in the
community at large.. . ."), affd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974); Fraser v. Robin
Dee Day Camp, 44 N.J. 480, 488, 210 A.2d 208, 212 (1965) (observing that "the day
camp has been offered to and is dependent upon the broad-based participation of
members of the general public").
See Dale, 160 N.J. at 590, 734 A.2d at 1211. In one year alone, Boy Scouts
allocated more than $1,000,000 for a nationwide televised advertising campaign. See
id. Boy Scouts also made use of the print media in an effort to advertise to the
public. See id.
97 See i&. In particular, the court pointed out
that the Monmouth Council, to
which James Dale formerly belonged, extended invitations to the public through
recruitment drives, posters, and various other promotional tools. See id. The court
also suggested that the practice of wearing Boy Scout uniforms in public, and
particularly to school, amounted to a symbolic invitation for others to join the
organization's ranks. See id. at 591, 734A.2d at 1211.
98 See id. at 592-94, 734 A.2d at 1212-13. The reasoning
underlying this factor is
that "certain organizations that benefit from relationships with the government and
other public accommodations are themselves places of public accommodation within
the meaning of the LAD." Id. at 591, 734 A.2d at 1211.
In Dale, Chief Justice Poritz explained that Boy Scouts enjoys "a close
relationship with the federal government" because it (i) was charte-ed by an act of
Congress; (ii) occasionally receives equipment and supplies from the federal
government; (iii) benefits from a "special association with each successive President
of the United States"; and (iv) retains close ties to the military. Id. at 592, 734 A.2d at
1212. As evidence of the existence of a close relationship between Boy Scouts and
the state and local governments of New Jersey, the court pointed to legislative acts
creating special rights and exemptions for Boy Scouts, as well as to the common
practice of fire and police department sponsorship of local councils. See id. at 593,
734 A.2d at 1212. Lastly, the court explained that Boy Scouts reaped great rewards
from its close relationship with public schools insofar as educational facilities provide
an endless sea of potential recruits, sponsorships, and meeting facilities. See id at
593-94, 734 A.2d at 1212-13.
95
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that Boy Scouts resembles many of the organizations previously held
to be public accommodations under the LAD. 99 Based upon these
factors, the court had little difficulty concluding that Boy Scouts is a
"place of public accommodation." ®
Chief Justice Poritz then acknowledged that the LAD expressly
provides for the following three exceptions: (i) places of public
accommodation that are distinctly private; (ii) educational facilities
of a religious nature; and (iii) public accommodations with an in loco
parentisstatus. 101 Addressing these exceptions in order, the court first
held that Boy Scouts' lack of membership criteria, its large
membership base, and its failure to limit membership to religious
persons or individuals subscribing to a fixed moral belief system
militate strongly against any finding that Boy Scouts is a distinctly
private organization.' °2 Second, Chief Justice Poritz dismissed the
99 See id. at 594, 734 A.2d at 1213. The court stressed that "[s]imilarity
to the
places of public accommodation listed in the LAD has been a benchmark for
determining whether the unlisted entity should be included." Id. With little
elaboration, the court concluded that "Boy Scouts' educational and recreational
nature, like the day camp in Fraseror the baseball teams in Little League, further
supports our conclusion that Boy Scouts is a 'place of public accommodation' under
the LAD." Id.
100 See id. at 602, 734 A.2d at 1218 (finding no applicable LAD exemptions in the
case at bar).
101See id. at 595, 734 A.2d at 1213 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(0 (West 1993)).
The same section of the LAD that provides examples of places of public
accommodation also states:
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to include or to apply to
any institution, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in
its naturedistinctly private, nor shall anything herein contained apply to
any educationalfacility operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or
sectarianinstitution,and the right of a naturalparent or one in loco parentisto
direct the education and upbringing of a child under his control is hereby
affirmed ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(o (West 1993) (emphasis added). Although acknowledging
the propriety of these statutory exceptions, Chief Justice Poritz explained that
exceptions included in a remedial act "'should generally be narrowly construed.'"
Dale, 160 N.J. at 595, 734 A.2d at 1213 (quoting Poff v. Caro, 228 N.J. Super. 370, 379,
549 A.2d 900, 904 (Law Div. 1987)).
102 See Dale, 160 N.J. at 596-601, 734 A.2d at 1214-17.
It is somewhat perplexing
that the Legislature included an exception for "distinctly private" organizations in
the LAD when the statute, by its own terms, applies only to public accommodations.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993). Prior to the decision in Dale, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit struggled to explain this apparent duplication. See
Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468, 476 (3d Cir. 1986). Judge
Garth, writing for the majority, concluded that the distinctly private exception
.represents the other side of the 'public accommodation' coin." Id. Judge Garth
reasoned that broad solicitation of the public is to a public accommodation what
selectivity is to a distinctly private organization. See id.
It is also possible that the distinctly private exception was made necessary by the
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religious education facility exception, noting that both Boy Scouts'
bylaws and publications expressly state that the organization is
nonsectarian. Lastly, the court determined that Boy Scouts may not
avail itself of the in loco parentis exception, which is reserved for
persons or entities assuming the role and functions of a natural
parent.'" On this point, the court conceded that Boy Scout leaders
occasionally supervise children placed in their care, but Chief Justice
Poritz stressed that these leaders are not charged with the
responsibilities normally associated with a parent, such as education
and child-rearing.10 5 After considering the three possible exemptions,
the New Jersey Supreme Court accordingly ruled that Boy Scouts is a
place of public accommodation and is not entitled to any of the
statutory exceptions.'0 To this end, the court concluded that Boy
Scouts violated the LAD when it revoked James Dale's membership
on the basis of his avowed homosexuality. 17
list of public accommodations included in the LAD. See supra note 92 (quoting N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(0 (West 1993)).
By providing an illustrative list of
accommodations, the Legislature may have been concerned that without the
distinctly private exception, the judiciary would deem, for example, all swimming
pools to be public accommodations, whether public or not, because swimming pools
had been included in the list. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(o (West 1993).
The Dale court then addressed Boy Scouts' argument that its adult membership,
to which James Dale belonged when his membership was revoked, is distinctly private
even though its youth membership may not be. See Dale, 160 N.J. at 600, 734 A.2d at
1216. The court explained:
In addition to the Scout Oath and Law requirements, adult members
are bound by the Declaration of Religious Principle, and are subject to
evaluation according to informal criteria designed to select only
individuals capable of accepting responsibility for the moral education
and care of other people's children in accordance with scouting values.
Id. at 600, 734 A.2d at 1216-17.
The court remained unpersuaded that it should focus on Boy Scouts' adult
membership, particularly because permitting an organization that does not otherwise
selectively choose its members to escape the LAD's coverage simply because one
component of the organization exercises selectivity would undermine the statute's
broad remedial goals. See id. at 600-01, 734 A.2d at 1217.
103 See id. at 601, 734 A.2d at 1217. The court accorded little weight to the fact
that the Boy Scout Oath pronounced a faith in God because expressing a belief in a
higher being, by itself, does not establish bona fide religious institution status. See id.
at n.10
104 See id at 602, 734 A.2d at 1217-18.
The in loco parentis exception is generally
available to persons who, for whatever reason, assume the role of a natural parent.
See id. at 602, 734 A.2d at 1218. Such a relationship normally includes rearing,
maintaining, and educating the child. See id. (citing Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 162,
478 A.2d 351, 355 (1984)).
105 SeeDae, 160 N.J. at 602, 734 A.2d at 1218.
(06

See id.

107

See id. at 603-04, 734 A.2d at 1218-19. In finding a violation of the LAD, the

court held that Boy Scout membership is both a privilege and an advantage because
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Having concluded its statutory analysis, the court turned its
attention to Dale's second claim, that Boy Scouts' actions also
violated New Jersey's common law. °8 The court acknowledged that
the enactment of the LAD did not necessarily preclude the possibility
of a common-law claim for unlawful discrimination.'0° The court,
however, stated that when a common-law claim is duplicative and
redresses identical rights, the judiciary may appropriately decline to
hear such claims."0 Finding Dale's common-law and statutory claims
duplicative, the court affirmed the appellate division's dismissal of
the common-law claim."'
Next, the court addressed whether applying the LAD to Boy
Scouts infringed upon Boy Scouts' freedom of association." 2 The
court observed that the freedom of association restricts the
government's ability to regulate a citizen's freedom to enter into and
to maintain personal relationships" 3 The court further explained
that even though intimate association most often refers to familial
relationships, the United States Supreme Court has endorsed an
extension of the freedom to certain nonfamilial relationships that
share similar traits." 4 Before addressing Boy Scouts' defense, the
members receive various benefits and learn multiple skills. See id Moreover,
members receive the advantage of having at their disposal a vast network of
connections. See id. at 603, 734 A.2d at 1218. The court also distinguished
Quinnipiac Council Boy Scouts of America v. Commission on Human Rights and
Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352 (Conn. 1987), in which the Supreme Court of
Connecticut held that Boy Scouts' refusal to admit a female was not a violation of the
state antidiscrimination statute because the woman had not been denied an
accommodation. See Dae, 160 N.J. at 603 n.11, 734 A.2d at 1218 n.11 (citing
Quinnipiac, 528 A.2d at 360). The New Jersey Supreme Court explained that
accommodations under the Connecticut statute were limited to goods and services.
See id. (citation omitted in original). The court observed that the LAD, by
juxtaposition, lists advantages, facilities, and privileges in addition to
accommodations. See id. at 603 n.11, 734 A.2d at 1218 n.11 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §
10:5-4 (West 1993) ("All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain . . . all the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public
accommodation ....- )).
108
See Dale, 160 N.J. at 604, 734A.2d at 1219.
109 See id.
11 See id. at 604-05, 734 A.2d at 1219. The LAD expressly provides that it does not
replace any other rights of action that combat discrimination in the State of New
Jersey. See id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-27 (West 1993)).
See id. at 604-05, 734 A.2d at 1219.
11
See id. at 605-21, 734A.2d at 1219-28.
11
See id. at 606, 734 A.2d at 1219 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 618 (1984)).
114 See Dae, 160 N.J. at 606, 734 A.2d at 1220 (quoting
Board of Dirs. of Rotary
Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987)). Quoting directly from
Rotary Club, the Dale court declared that the freedom of intimate association attaches
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court closely examined the United States Supreme Court's decisions
in Roberts and Rotary Club, in which the Court held that large size and
lack of genuinely selective membership criteria militate against
extending the freedom of intimate association to an organization." 5
Borrowing heavily from the United States Supreme Court's analyses
in Roberts and Rotary Club, the New Jersey Supreme Court articulated
four factors and applied them to Boy Scouts: (1) size-Boy Scouts
has a large membership, both nationally and locally;" 6 (2)
nonselectivity-age and sex are Boy Scouts' only admission
requirements;11 7 (3) inclusive purpose-Boy Scouts intends for its
members to be a cross-section of society; 8 and (4) openness to the
public-Boy Scouts' policy often permits nonmembers to attend
various functions." 9 The court concluded that these factors,
considered in the aggregate, fail to establish that Boy Scouts'
members engage in relationships sufficiently intimate to warrant
protection under the First Amendment.'2
In contrast to the freedom of intimate association, the court
explained that the freedom of expressive association protects the
right to collectively pursue a wide array of social, political, economic,
to "'those relationships... that presuppose 'deep attachments and commitments to
the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special
community of thoughts, experiences and beliefs but also distinctly [sic] personal
aspects of one's life."" Id. at 606, 734 A.2d at 1220 (quoting Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at
545) (ellipsis in original).
15 See id. at 606-10, 734 A.2d at 1219-22; see also
supra text accompanying notes 5875 (discussing the Roberts and Rotary Club decisions).
116 See id. at 609, 734 A.2d at 1221. In evaluating size as a factor
in its analysis, the
court emphasized that, "contrary to Boy Scouts' assertion, whether we evaluate the
Boy Scout organization at the national or local troop level, the result would be the
same." Id.To prove its point, the court performed its size analysis at the local level.
See id. After noting that local troops range in size from 15 to 30 scouts, the court
remarked that the United States Supreme Court had previously found a Rotary Club
chapter with as few as 20 members to be lacking intimate association rights. See id.
(citing Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 546).
117 See id. To join the Boy Scouts one need only be male and
between 11 and 17
years of age. See id. Although acknowledging that the admission criteria for adult
membership may be somewhat more stringent, the court repeated its earlier finding
that scout leaders do not assume a parental role and, therefore, concluded that the
relationship scout leaders engage in with troop members is not of an intimate
nature. See i&
118 See id. at 610, 734A.2d at 1222.
119 See id. In this portion of its analysis, the court again relied heavily on language
from the Rotary Club opinion. See id. In that decision, the United States Supreme
Court found it significant that the Rotary Clubs often conducted activities with
strangers in attendance and tried to obtain local media coverage of their meetings.
See id.(quoting Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 547).
20 See Dale,160 N.J. at 610, 734A.2d at
1222.
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religious, educational, and cultural goals.12 1 Chief Justice Poritz
explained, however, that this broad freedom is not without
boundaries.'2 First, the court stated that the State may compel an
organization to admit unwanted members if doing so will not
significantly affect the organization's ability to express its
viewpoints.In Second, the court asserted that curtailing the freedom
of expressive association is occasionally permissible if such
curtailment is the only available means to serve a compelling state
interest. 124
Applying this analytical framework, the court first ruled that
Dale's presence in his local troop would not significantly impede Boy
Scouts' ability to pursue and advocate its views."3 The court observed
that the condemnation of homosexuality is not a position that Boy
Scouts traditionally has advocated.26 Elaborating on this point, Chief
1
1
123

See id. at 610-11, 734A.2d at 1222.
See id. at 612, 734A.2d at 1223.
See id. at 611, 734 A.2d at 1222 (quoting New York State Club Ass'n v. City of

NewYork, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)).
124 See id. at 612, 734 A.2d at 1223.
The compelling state interest must be
"unrelated to the suppression of ideas.'" Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)). Employing a balancing test, the court explained
that "[t]he right of expressive association must, therefore, be weighed against this
compelling interest in each case." Id. Referring to the LAD, the court wrote:
State laws against discrimination may take precedence over the right of
expressive association because "acts of invidious discrimination in the
distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages
cause unique evils that government has a compelling interest to
prevent-wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may
transmit."
Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628).
15 See
id.
1
See Dalk, 160 N.J. at 613, 734 A.2d at 1223-24. Boy Scouts argued that the Scout
Law and Oath is representative of its members' collective views and expresses the
view that homosexuality is immoral. See id. at 612-13, 734 A.2d at 1223. The Scout
Law instructs Boy Scouts, inter alia, to be clean. See id. at 612, 734 A.2d at 1223. The
Scout Oath directs its members to remain "'physically strong, mentally awake, and
morally straight'" Id. (quoting Boy Scout Oath) (emphasis added). Both the term
"clean" and the phrase "morally straight" receive further discussion in the Boy Scout
Handbook. See id. at 613-15, 734 A.2d at 1224-25. According to the Handbook, to be
"morally straight" is "[t]o be a person of strong character, guide your life with
honesty, purity, and justice. Respect and defend the rights of all people. Your
relationships with others should be honest and open. Be clean in your speech and
actions, and faithful in your religious beliefs." Id. at 614, 734 A.2d at 1224 (quoting
Boy Scout Handbook). As for the term "clean," the handbook explains that "[a]
Scout is CLEAN. A Scout keeps his body and mind fit and clean. He chooses the
company of those who live by these same ideals ....

There's a[ ] kind of dirt that

won't come off by washing. . ... " Id. (quoting Boy Scout Handbook). In sum, Boy
Scouts argued that this established that its members associated for the purpose of
condemning homosexuality. See id. at 612-13, 734 A.2d at 1223.
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Justice Poritz explained that Boy Scouts expelled Dale because of his
homosexual status, not because he held incompatible beliefs or
viewpoints.'2 Noting the enormous social, economic, and political
costs of discrimination, the court further concluded that the
enforcement of the LAD constitutes a compelling state interest that
outweighs any incidental abridgment of Boy Scouts' freedom of
expressive association.'" Chief Justice Poritz further explained that

Chief Justice Poritz conceded that Boy Scouts "expresses a belief in moral
values," but remained "[un]persuaded . . . that a 'shared goal[ ]' of Boy Scout
members is to associate in order to preserve the view that homosexuality is immoral."
Id. at 613, 734 A.2d at 1223-24 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622) (second set of
brackets in original). The chief justice stated this opinion because "[tihe words
'morally straight' and 'clean' do not, on their face, express anything about sexuality,
much less that homosexuality, in particular, is immoral." Dale, 160 N.J. at 614, 734
A.2d at 1224. The court was skeptical that young boys would understand these words
to mean anything "other than a commitment to be good." Id.
12 See id. at 617, 734 A.2d at 1226. Boy Scouts disputed
that Dale was expelled
because of his homosexual status by pointing to a letter it mailed to Dale explaining
that his membership was being revoked based upon Boy Scouts' "'policy [to]
exclud[e] adults whose views of the morality of homosexual conduct differ from the
views held by Boy Scouts of America.'" Id. (quoting Boy Scouts letter) (brackets in
original). The court clearly preferred to rely instead on the contents of the first
revocation letter Dale received. See id. The court seemed to question, in this regard,
whether the sentiments expressed in the subsequent letter, upon which Boy Scouts
relied, were altogether sincere, remarking that "[i]n subsequent letters, Boy Scouts
attempted to connect Dale's termination" with his viewpoints. Id. (emphasis added).
In the first letter, Boy Scouts wrote that "'It]he grounds for [Dale's] membership
revocation are the standards for leadership established by Boy Scouts of America,
which specifically forbid membership to homosexuals.'" Id. (quoting Boy Scouts
letter).
Chief Justice Poritz also referred to statements Dale had made in which he
embraced the values taught by Boy Scouts. See id. at 616-17, 734 A.2d at 1225-26. As
Dale explained it, "I strove never to do anything inconsistent with the values
embodied in the Scout Oath .... In all my years in Scouting, I always tried to live in
accordance with the Scout Law and to adhere to the values embodied in it." Id. at
616, 734 A.2d at 1225 (quoting James Dale). This prompted the court to conclude
that Dale is not "suggest[ing] that Boy Scouts should allow him openly to advocate
acceptance of homosexuality." Id. This left no room for doubt, the court declared,
that the true reason for Dale's expulsion was his status, not the alleged conflict of
moral views. See id&at 618, 734 A.2d at 1226.
128 See id. at 619, 734 A.2d at 1227. In what is perhaps the most passionate
portion
of the court's lengthy opinion, the chiefjustice eloquently wrote:
The invocation of stereotypes to justify discrimination is all too
familiar. Indeed, the story of discrimination is the story of stereotypes
that limit the potential of men, women, and children who belong to
excluded groups. By way of example, we observe that certain claimed
propensities of character were once invoked to advocate the
subjugation of women ....
The sad truth is that excluded groups and individuals have been
prevented from full participation in the social, economic, and political
life of our country. The human price of this bigotry has been
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abridging Boy Scouts' speech was permissible because the LAD
achieves its goal of eradicating discrimination by the most narrow
means available and without distinguishing among speakers'
viewpoints.'2 Based on the foregoing reasons, the court held that
applying the LAD to Boy Scouts does not impermissibly infringe
upon its freedom of expressive association." 0
The court then addressed Boy Scouts' final argument that the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston 3 protected Boy Scouts'
expulsion of Dale.3 2 In Hurley, the Supreme Court held that
Massachusetts' public accommodation statute could not be used to
compel a private parade organizer to admit a group composed of
homosexual and bisexual members"s
The New Jersey Supreme
Court explained that Hurley can be distinguished on its facts, and,
therefore, Boy Scouts' reliance on Hurley was misguided. 3
Chief
Justice Poritz pointed out that, whereas admission of the group in
Hurley forced the parade's organizers to alter their overall message,
Dale's readmission would leave Boy Scouts' moral viewpoints
unaffected.3 5 The court further explained that a parade's overall
enormous. At a most fundamental level, adherence to the principle of
equality demands that our legal system protect the victims of invidious
discrimination.
Dale, 160 N.J. at 618-19, 734 A.2d at 1226-27 (citations and footnote omitted).
The court also stressed that, in 1991, the New Jersey Legislature amended the
LAD, which was enacted in 1945, to include "sexual orientation" among the
protected classes. See id. at 619-20, 734 A.2d at 1227. The court wrote:
With the amendment of the LAD, the Legislature declared that
discrimination in places of public accommodation on the basis of "affectional
or sexual orientation... [is] a matter of concern to the government of the
State, and that such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper
privileges of the inhabitants of the State but menaces the institutions and
foundation of a free democratic State."
Id. at 620, 734 A.2d at 1227-28 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1993))
(ellIsis and brackets in original).
See id. at 621, 734 A.2d at 1228.
ISOSee id.
1 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
132 See DaIe, 160 N.J. at 621-22, 734 A.2d at 1228. The facts of Hurley are as follows:
GLIB, a group founded by gays, lesbians, and bisexuals of Irish-American heritage,
applied for permission to march in Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade. Hurley, 515
U.S. at 561. The South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, a private entity that
annually organizes the parade, denied GLIB's request, prompting GLIB to seek
judicial relief under, inter alia, the public accommodations act that existed under
Massachusetts' law. See id. at 560-61.
1
See Dale, 160 N.J. at 622, 734 A.2d at 1228-29 (discussing Hurley).
134 See id. at 623, 734 A.2d at 1229 (distinguishing
Hurleyon its facts).
135 See id. at 623-24, 734 A.2d at 1229 ("In short, the reinstatement
of Dale does
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message is composed of the various presentations made by individual
groups along the parade route.'s' The court stressed that, in contrast
to the aspiring marchers in Hurley, Dale did not intend to use the Boy
Scouts as a platform from which to promote his views on
homosexuality. 37 The court further distinguished Hurley, pointing
out that scout leadership, unlike participation in a parade, is not a
form of pure speech.s
Having distinguished Hurley, the court
did not run afoul of Boy Scouts'
concluded that Dale's reinstatement
39
First Amendment rights.
Justice Handler, concurring in the court's judgment and
reasoning, authored a separate opinion to elaborate upon two aspects
of the court's analysis."' First, the justice emphasized the importance
of genuine membership selectivity in determining whether an

accommodation is public under the Law Against Discrimination.' 41
Second, the justice focused upon the delicate balancing of the
individual's right not to be discriminated against and the
organization's right to free speech.'4
Although Justice Handler endorsed the court's use of the
genuine selectivity factor in considering whether Boy Scouts may avail
itself of the distinctly private exception, the justice explained that it is
equally appropriate to rely on selectivity criteria when making the
initial determination of whether an organization is a public
accommodation under the statute1u
Justice Handler also
not compel Boy Scouts to express any message.").
W See id. at 622, 734 A.2d at 1229. Quoting from the unanimous opinion in
Hurley, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that "'in the context of an
expressive parade, as with a protest march, the parade's overall message is distilled
from the individual presentations along the way, and each unit's expression is
perceived by spectators as part of the whole.'" Id. (quoting Hurly, 515 U.S. at 577).
1
See id. at 623, 734 A.2d at 1229. As the court phrased it, "Dale does not come
to Boy Scout meetings 'carrying a banner.'" Id.
138 See id.
"[U]nlike a parade, where the 'speech itself . . . [is] the public
accommodation,' . . . permitting Dale to remain in a leadership position in no way
prevents Boy Scouts from 'invok[ing] its right as a private speaker to shape its
expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another.'" Id.
(quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573, 574) (ellipsis and last two sets of brackets in
original) (citation omitted). The court also flatly rejected, without elaboration, the
contention that by readmitting Dale, Boy Scouts was symbolically endorsing
homosexuality. See id.
139 See Dale, 160 NJ. at 624, 734 A.2d at 1229.
140 See id. at 624-51, 734 A.2d at 1230-45 (Handler,
J., concurring).
141 See id. at 624, 734 A.2d at 1230 (Handler,J.,
concurring).
1
See i& at 625, 734 A.2d at 1230 (Handler, J., concurring). It bears repeating
that Justice Handler "fully endorse[d]" the majority's reasoning. See id. at 624, 734
A.2d at 1230 (Handler,J., concurring).
14 See id. at 626-27, 734 A.2d at 1231 (Handler, J., concurring).
Recall that Chief
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underscored that genuine selectivity refers to membership criteria
actually enforced by an organization to select new members, not
stated criteria casually abandoned in practice. t " Moreover, the justice
explained that a club exercising some degree of selectivity may still be
a public accommodation under the statute if the selective criteria are
significantly outnumbered by nonselective membership criteria."'
Applying this analysis to Boy Scouts, Justice Handler concluded that
the scouting organization does not exercise any genuine selectivity
and is, therefore, a place of public accommodation.
Justice Poritz, in writing the opinion for the court, chose not to rely on the genuine
selectivity factor in determining whether Boy Scouts is a public accommodation,
choosing instead to reserve that analysis for a subsequent portion of her opinion in
which she explains why Boy Scouts cannot avail itself of the statutory exception for
distinctly private clubs. See id. at 596, 734 A.2d at 1214. In what may have been a
response to Justice Handler's concurrence, the chiefjustice wrote:
Solicitation of a broad membership base is closely related to the issue
of selectivity in membership, which may explain why various courts
have considered both factors in their analyses of both "place of public
accommodation" and the "distinctly private" exception. We have
reviewed the multiple ways in which Boy Scouts reaches out to the
public and, therefore, will consider the selectivity issue as the principal
determinant of "distinctly private" status.
Id. (citation omitted).
Without expressly saying so, the chiefjustice implies that she does not disagree
with those courts that choose to rely on the selectivity factor in determining whether
a place is public. See id. Nevertheless, the chiefjustice opted to discuss Boy Scouts'
selectivity, or lack thereof, in the distinctly private portion of her analysis. See id.
This may begin to explain why Justice Handler wrote separately despite
endorsing the court's reasoning. See id. at 624-51, 734 A.2d at 1230-45 (Handler, J.,
concurring). Justice Handler likely wanted to dispel any possible confusion that may
have resulted from the Chief Justice's decision to reserve discussion of genuine
membership selectivity for the distinctly private analysis; by writing separately, Justice
Handler was able to emphasize that it is also entirely appropriate to focus on
selectivity when initially determining the public nature of an accommodation. See id.
at 624, 626, 734 A.2d at 1230, 1231 (Handler, J., concurring) ("Membership
selectivity is equally relevant to whether an organization may be initially considered
to be a 'place of public accommodation.'").
14 See id. at 628, 734 A.2d at 1232 (Handler, J., concurring)
("The hallmark of
genuine selectivity is that the organization actually uses its stated selection criteria to
limit its membership in accordance with those criteria.").
1
See Dae, 160 N.J. at 631, 734 A.2d at 1233-34 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice
Handler noted that the Division on Civil Rights-the agency responsible for
enforcing the LAD-has adopted this approach as well. See id. (discussing Hinden v.
United States Power Squadrons, No. P02S-105 (Div. on Civil Rights Dec. 21, 1973)
(holding that a boating club excluding women was a public accommodation even
though new members were required to pass a boating course because nearly every
male who passed was admitted), aftd, No. A-3104-73 (App. Div. July 18, 1975), certif.
denied, 69 N.J. 382, 354 A.2d 310 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 943 (1976)).
14 See id. at 633-34, 734 A.2d at 1233-34 (Handler,
J., concurring). Justice
Handler noted that Boy Scouts (i) uses only age and sex as selection criteria; (ii) has
more than five million members nationwide; (iii) fails to require that new members
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Justice Handler then addressed Boy Scouts' argument that the
application of the LAD violated its freedom of expressive
association.14 7 Focusing his inquiry upon the role that status-based
discrimination plays in expressive association analysis, Justice Handler
endorsed the court's reasoning but stressed the significance of the
court's holding for the homosexual community-a community in
which the line separating status and identity is often blurred.'4 The
justice explained that the First Amendment does not protect
discrimination based on status because organizations should not be
permitted to rely on unproven stereotypes as a shorthand means of
determining membership applicants' viewpoints. 4 9 Justice Handler
be sponsored by existing ones; and (iv) disseminates publications inviting all boys to
join. See id.
147 See id. at 634-51, 734 A.2d at 1235-45 (Handler,J., concurring).
14
See id. at 635, 734 A.2d at 1235-36 (Handler, J., concurring). The court's
reasoning and conclusion was that Boy Scouts' decision to revoke Dale's membership
was not protected under the freedom of expressive association because Boy Scouts
discriminated against Dale on the basis of his status as a homosexual, not because his
views conflicted with Boy Scouts' views. See id. at 617, 734 A.2d at 1226 ("Dale was
expelled because of his status and not because his membership conflicted with Boy
Scouts' message."). As Justice Handler explained it, "The Court's holding is
especially significant because of the distinctive interdependence of expression and
identity for lesbians and gay men, and the effect of that merger of speech and status
on an organization's First Amendment freedom of expressive association." Id. at 635,
734 A.2d at 1235-36 (Handler,J., concurring).
Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, Justice Handler crafted a
strong argument in support of drawing a distinction between a club that
discriminates on the basis of expression versus a club that discriminates on the basis
of status. See id at 635-36, 734 A.2d at 1236 (Handler, J., concurring) (citing Board
of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); New York State
Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984)).
149 See id. at 636, 734 A.2d at 1236 (Handler, J., concurring) ("The
rationale for
drawing a distinction between status and expression . . . is that 'unsupported
generalizations' and stereotypes based on a person's identity are not permissible
means of ascertaining the particular views of that person . . . ."). For example, an
organization founded to support the involvement of the United States in a particular
war (e.g., the Balkan conflict) may not exclude women because it believes women are
generally opposed to violence of any sort, including war, more precisely, the
organization, assuming it is not a state actor, may exclude the member, but the First
Amendment will not come to its rescue if and when the state enacts an
antidiscrimination statute. See id "In contrast to exclusion based on status-based
stereotypes, when the denial of membership is premised on actual expression, the
organization can legitimately claim a basis for its assessment that the excluded
person would 'change the content or impact of the organization's speech.'" Id.
(quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628).
Justice Handler did note that there is a narrow exception to the general rule
that clubs may not discriminate on the basis of status. See id. When the core
purpose(s) of an organization is inextricably intertwined with the status of a
proposed member, then the freedom of expressive association prohibits the state
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then acknowledged the difficulty of applying this rule to Dale's
lawsuit because his speech is so closely related to his status.1 -" The
justice observed that in cases such as Dale's, in which self-identifying
speech is at issue, status and expression seemingly merge.'" Justice
Handler reasoned that the LAD's protections would be rendered
largely illusory if it were interpreted to protect a person's status, but
not a person's right to reveal his status.'52 Justice Handler remarked
that the ability to self-identify takes on added importance when a
person's status is not readily discernable from observation.!ss
from interfering in the organization's activities. See id, An example of such a
situation is when an African-American seeks membership in the Ku Klux Klan. See id.
at 636-37, 734 A.2d at 1236-37 (Handler, J., concurring) (citing Invisible Empire of
the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Town of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281, 288 (D. Md.
1988)). Requiring the KKK to admit this applicant would compromise the group's
primary message-"'that blacks and whites should not mix.'" Id. at 637, 734 A.2d at
1237 (Handler, J., concurring) (quoting InvisibleEmpire, 700 F. Supp. at 289).
150 See id. at 638, 734 A.2d at 1237 (Handler, J., concurring). This
difficulty arose
out of Boy Scouts' contention that it expelled Dale not because he was a homosexual
(i.e., impermissible status-based discrimination), but rather because he said he was a
homosexual (i.e., permissible expression-based discrimination). See id at 638, 734
A.2d at 1237-38 (Handler,J., concurring).
1 See Dale 160 N.J. at 639, 734 A.2d at 1238 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice
Handler reasoned that the statement, "'I am gay' . . . not only describes, but
performs, the action named." See id. (quoting Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in
Equal Protection: The Vsibility Presumption and the Case of "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell," 108
YAu L.J. 485, 550 (1998)) (internal quotation omitted). Justice Handler also noted
that some commentators believe gays and lesbians have a unique need for selfidentifying speech. See id. at 639-40, 734 A.2d at 1238 (citing Brian C. Murchison,
Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 443, 468 (1998) and
Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1718 (1993)).
1
See id. at 640, 734 A.2d at 1238 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Handler
wrote:
A person covered by the LAD has the right to enjoy his or her
protected status without suffering discrimination because of who he or
she is. If the very means of making those characteristics known-selfidentification-can legitimately justify discrimination against that
person, then the antidiscrimination protections of the LAD are
illusory.
Id.
1
See id. The status of most groups protected by public accommodations laws is
easily identified through observation; these might include race, gender, physical
disabilities, and age. For these groups, verbal self-identification is of less significance
because their physical appearance identifies their status. By contrast, a person's
sexual and religious orientation is not readily apparent. See id. at 640, 734 A.2d at
1238-39 (Handler, J., concurring). Several courts, as Justice Handler noted, have
recognized this distinction in the area of religious orientation. See id. at 640-41, 734
A.2d at 1239 (Handler, J., concurring) (citing Islamic Ctr. v. City of Starkville, 840
F.2d 293, 300 (5th Cir. 1988) and Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)). More importantly, Justice Handler remarked, the
New Jersey Legislature defined affectional or sexual orientation, as those terms are
used in the LAD, to mean "male or female heterosexuality, homosexuality or
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Therefore, Justice Handler concluded that self-identifying speech, at
least in the context of sexual and religious orientation, is protected
under the LAD 4
The justice then considered whether Dale's comments, which
prompted Boy Scouts to revoke his membership, qualified as selfidentifying statements protected under the statute.T Justice Handler
decided that Dale's comments that appeared in the newspaper article
were so closely related to his status as a homosexual that they could
Justice
properly be characterized as self-identifying speech.' m
a
promoted
Handler noted that Dale's remarks neither generally
homosexual lifestyle nor specifically expressed any views on his role
as a gay Boy Scout leader.'5 7 Classifying Dale's comments as selfbisexuality by inclination, practice, identity or expression, having a history thereof or
being perceived, presumed or identified by others as having such an orientation." Id.
at 641, 734 A.2d at 1239 (Handler, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Based upon
this language, Justice Handler concluded that "the Legislature affirmed the
significant role of self-identifying speech for lesbians and gay men, much in the same
way that the Supreme Court has acknowledged that role in respect of religion." Id.
54 See id.
15 See id. at 641-43, 734 A.2d
at 1239-40.
156 See id. at 641-42, 734 A.2d at 1239-40 (Handler, J., concurring). The Newark
Star-Ledgerarticle in question stated, in pertinent part:
James Dale, 19, co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay
Alliance... said he lived a double life while in high school, pretending
to be straight while attending a military academy.
He remembers dating girls and even laughing at homophobic jokes
while at school, only admitting his homosexuality during his second
year at Rutgers.
"I was looking for a role model, someone who was gay and
accepting of me," Dale said, adding he wasn't just seeking sexual
experiences, but a community that would take him in and provide him
with a support network and friends.
Id. at 642, 734 A.2d at 1239-40 (Handler, J., concurring) (quoting Kinga Borondy,
Seminar Addresses Needs of Homosexual Teens, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ.), July 8, 1990,
§ 2, at 11). InJustice Handler's opinion, Dale's comments in the newspaper article
simply identified him as a gay man. See id. at 642-43, 734 A.2d at 1240 (Handler, J.,
concurring).
157 See Dale, 160 NJ. at 64243, 734 A.2d at 1240 (Handler, J., concurring).
In
Justice Handler's opinion, this fact alone persuasively distinguished Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998), a case remarkably
similar (at least factually, if not in the holding) to Dale. See id. at 642 n.5, 734 A.2d at
1240 n.5 (Handler, J., concurring). In Curran, a local Boy Scouts council was sued
for violation of California's antidiscrimination statute after it refused to approve the
homosexual plaintiff's request for an adult leadership position. See Curran, 952 P.2d
at 219. The Supreme Court of California ultimately dismissed the plaintiffis
complaint when a majority of the court held that Boy Scouts is not a business
establishment within the meaning of the antidiscrimination statute. See id. at 238.
Justice Handler, however, focused on a comment that the plaintiff, Timothy Curran,
had made when applying for the adult leadership position. See Dale, 160 NJ. at 642
n.5, 734 A.2d at 1240 n.5 (discussing the facts of Curran). Curran allegedly stated
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identifying speech, Justice Handler determined that Boy Scouts had
discriminated against him on the basis of his homosexual status."
Justice Handler announced that to justify discrimination on the
basis of Dale's status, Boy Scouts must demonIstrate that it advocated a
consistent, clear, and particular message on homosexuality and that
Dale's readmission would be incompatible with that message.'" The
justice concluded, however, that Boy Scouts' position regarding
homosexuality was so vague and inconsistent that it was not even
clear whether the organization, as a general matter, endorsed or
opposed it.'60 Justice Handler expressly rejected the myth that
homosexual scoutmasters pose a greater risk of harm to young boys
because of their sexual orientation.' 6 Justice Handler observed that
such a pernicious fear is based upon two lingering stereotypes proven
to be false: (1) that homosexuals are inherently immoral and (2)
that gays, as a group, are more likely than are heterosexuals to molest
children. 62 In light of these observations, Justice Handler concluded
that he wished to obtain a leadership position in Boy Scouts "because he so firmly
believed personally in a homosexual lifestyle that there was... not anything wrong
with it, and he wanted to make sure that other kids understood that." Curran, 952
P.2d at 222 (internal quotations omitted). In Justice Handler's opinion, this was a
marked distinction because Dale, unlike the plaintiff in Curran, "did not seek
membership in order to challenge Boy Scouts' purported views on homosexuality or
to project his own views on other scouts." Dae, 160 N.J. at 642 n.5, 734 A.2d at 1240
n.5 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Handler remarked that "[h]ad Dale expressed
more general views on the morality, social implications, history, or etiology of
homosexuality in his role as a Boy Scout leader, which directly conflicted with Boy
Scouts' stated positions, Boy Scouts could claim that its discrimination was based
purely on expression." Id. at 642, 734 A.2d at 1240 (Handler, J., concurring).
158 See id. at 643, 734 A.2d at 1240
(Handler,J., concurring).
1
See id.; see also supra note 149 (noting Justice Handler's explanation that
requiring the KKK to admit an African-American would compromise the
organization's specific expressive purpose).
60 See id. at 643-45, 734 A.2d at 1240-41 (Handler,
J., concurring). Thejustice was
unable to agree with Boy Scouts that the terms "clean" and "morally straight," as used
in scout literature, convey a clear message on homosexuality. See id. at 643, 734 A.2d
at 1240 (Handler, J., concurring). The justice also remarked that "Boy Scouts'
official position on issues of sexuality is that 'boys should learn about sex and family
life from their parents, consistent with their spiritual beliefs.'" Id. at 644, 734 A.2d at
1241 (Handler, J., concurring) (quoting the court's opinion). Lastly, the justice
found it remarkable that Boy Scouts regularly renews the charters of religious
institutions that approve of homosexuality. See id. at 645, 734 A.2d at 1241 (Handler,
J., concurring). These factors taken together, the justice concluded, establish that
Boy Scouts does not have a "clear, particular, and consistent message concerning
homosexuality." Id.
161 See id. at 648, 734 A.2d at 1243 (Handler, J., concurring)
("The myth that a
homosexual male is more likely than a heterosexual male to molest children has
been demolished.").
1
See id. at 647-49, 734 A.2d at 1242-43 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice

2000]

DALE v. BOY SCOUTS OFAMERICA

983

that Boy Scouts' actions were not protected as an exercise of First
Amendment rights.'6
Soon after the New Jersey Supreme Court announced its ruling
in Dale, Boy Scouts announced that it intended to appeal.'" On
January 14, 2000, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, and a final ruling is expected early this summer.'" In light
of these recent developments, it seems appropriate to speculate as to
why the Supreme Court granted certiorari and where the Court will
direct its focus. 1
It is unlikely that the Court will devote much attention to Boy
Scouts' freedom of intimate association. Although the Supreme
Court has repeatedly declined to delineate the outer limits of this
freedom, it is difficult to imagine that Boy Scouts, an organization
with roughly five million members, is sufficiently intimate to fall
within a category of relationships 67traditionally "attended by the
creation and sustenance of a family."
On the other hand, an extended focus by the Court on Boy
Scouts' freedom of expressive association would not be surprising.
For example, Dale may be used by the Court to clarify how its decision
five years ago in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston fits into the freedom of association framework
developed during the 1980s in the Roberts-Rotary Club-New York State
Club line of cases.'" Recall that in Hurley, the Court blocked an
application of Massachusetts's antidiscrimination statute that would
have compelled the organizers of Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade to
admit a group of gay and lesbian marchers.'6 In short, the Court
Handler also admonished the trial court judge for relying on some of these very

same myths. See id. at 649, 734 A.2d at 1243-44 (Handler, J., concurring).
1
See Dae, 160 N.J. at 645, 734 A-2d at 1241 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice
Handler concluded that Boy Scouts failed to "establish[ ] a clear, particular, and
consistent message concerning homosexuality, [and therefore] the First Amendment
cannot excuse Boy Scouts' status-based discrimination against a member, based solely
on his sexual orientation, in violation of the LAD." Id.
I See Lyle Denniston, N.J. Court Rejects Boy Scouts' Gay Ban, BALT. SUN, Aug. 5,

1999, at 1.
16 See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S.
Ct. 865 (2000).
166 The United States Supreme Court will only entertain Boy
Scouts' federal
defenses. The Court will not reconsider the New Jersey Supreme Court's finding
that Boy Scouts is public accommodation under the LAD.
167

168

Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).

Interestingly, the Hurley decision appears to have been a focus of Boy Scouts'

brief petitioning the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. See Rocco Cammarere, Boy
Scouts to Justices: Look to the FirstAmendment, 8 N.J. LAw., Dec. 27, 1999, at 52.
16
See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515

U.S. 557, 573 (1995).
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held that parades are a form of pure speech and that the inclusion of
gay and lesbian marchers would impermissibly force the organizers to
alter their message."'
The decision in Hurley did not turn on the parade organizers'
freedom of association, but rather on their freedom of speech. This
is clear from the penultimate paragraph of the unanimous opinion,
in which the Court speculates that it would have reached the same
outcome under a freedom of association analysis because the message
that the gay and lesbian group wished to convey was at odds with the
views of marchers already taking part in the parade.'
Boy Scouts faces a difficult task if it hopes to convince the Court
that the Hurley decision compels judgment in its favor. First,
Scouting, in contrast to participation in a parade, is not a form of
pure speech. Second, James Dale's readmission in Boy Scouts would
not force the organization to alter its message.
If assistant
scoutmasters were assigned the task of disseminating Boy Scouts'
views concerning homosexuality, it might stand to reason that
requiring Boy Scouts to reappoint Dale to his former leadership
position would infringe upon its freedom of expressive association.
The reality is, however, that assistant scoutmasters teach boys how to
tie knots, not that homosexuality is immoral. Moreover, James Dale,
unlike the gay and lesbian marchers in Hurley, does not seek to use
Boy Scouts as a venue from which to air his opinions concerning
homosexuality. Considered in this light, it becomes apparent that
Boy Scouts is attempting to create the appearance of a conflict of
expressive views where one does not otherwise exist.
It is also possible that the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari because the judgment entered by the New Jersey Supreme
Court reinstates not only James Dale's membership in Boy Scouts, but
also his leadership position as an assistant scoutmaster.
This
hearkens back to a separate opinion at the appellate division in which
Judge Landau drew a distinction between membership and
leadership, reasoning that Boy Scouts could be forced to readmit
James Dale as an adult member, but that compelling Boy Scouts to
reappoint Dale as an assistant scoutmaster requires the organization
to symbolically endorse Dale's homosexuality in violation of its
freedom of association."2 The New Jersey Supreme Court implicitly
170

See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573 ("[T]his use of the State's power violates the

fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message.").
171 See id. at
580-81.
17 See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 308 NJ. Super. 516,
561-64, 706 A.2d 270,
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rejected this distinction, but the court failed to explain why Dale's
membership and leadership fortunes in the Boy Scouts rise and fall
together.'
At first blush, distinguishing between membership and
leadership appears to offer an attractive compromise by
accommodating both the private organization's interest in unfettered
self-governance and the State's interest in eradicating discrimination
in places of public accommodation. The United States Supreme
Court has written that "[tihere can be no clearer example of an
intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a
regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not
desire." 7 4 It might be said, however, that the better example is an
antidiscrimination statute that forces a private organization to accept
leaders it does not desire. If this is true, does an organization's
interest in appointing its own leaders free from government
interference
outweigh the State's interest in eliminating
discrimination in public accommodations, i.e., may an organization
that lacks sufficient protection under the freedom of association to
discriminate against unwanted members nevertheless discriminate
5
against leaders whom it wishes to exclude?""
Under the Court's current freedom of association framework,
such a distinction is only justified if compelling the private
organization to readmit the plaintiff to both membership and
leadership positions would create a conflict of expressive views with
regard to the latter, but not the former. As far as Boy Scouts and
James Dale are concerned, the distinction is not a tenable one. The
duties of neither an assistant scoutmaster nor a Boy Scout member
include teaching, learning, or discussing the topic of homosexuality.
294-95 (App. Div. 1998) (Landau, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
addition to being a Boy Scout member, Dale served in a leadership capacity as an
assistant scoutmaster. See id. at 562, 706 A.2d at 294 (Landau, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
173 In all fairness, the court appeared to be responding to Judge Landau
when it
wrote: "We reject the notion that Dale's presence in the organization is symbolic of
Boy Scouts' endorsement of homosexuality." Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 160 N.J.
562, 623, 734 A.2d 1196, 1229 (1999). In the same paragraph, the court also
concludes that permitting Dale to resume a leadership position does not prevent Boy
Scouts from shaping its expression by speaking on some subjects while remaining
silent on others. See id. This brief discussion is buried, however, in the middle of the
court's analysis of the Hurley decision and fails to explain fully why a
leadership/membership distinction is unjustified.
174 Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (emphasis
added).
1
To date, the Supreme Court has yet to hear argument in a case in which a
plaintiff seeks to compel a private organization to appoint him to a leadership
position. Roberts, Rotary Club, and New York State Club only addressed membership.
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Moreover, Boy Scouts "admits that the terms 'member' and 'leader'
are 'interchangeable' for the million-plus adults at all levels." 76 It
follows, therefore, that if Boy Scouts can be required to readmit Dale
as a member, similarly forcing Boy Scouts to reappoint Dale to his
assistant scoutmaster position does not violate the freedom of
association.

Stephen P. Warren
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